Religious Pluralism and Critical Realism

Schmidt-Leukel, Perry

Abstract

This chapter discusses Hick’s pluralism in the overall context of his critical realist interpretation of religion and his defence of a religious worldview as rooted in religious experience. The distinction between the “Real an sich” and “the Real as humanly thought of and experienced”, which is central for his version of pluralism, is analysed in light of his understanding of the Ultimate’s ineffable unlimitedness (as a teaching found in many religious traditions) on the one hand, and his epistemology on the other. I argue that Hick’s position on divine ineffability or transcategoriality is not the result of his “Kantianism”, but should best be understood as a first order claim about the Ultimate (as being such that no human categories apply). In Hick’s case, Kantianism does not account for the apophatic aspect but rather refers to the cataphatic dimension of religious language. It is thus distorting and misleading to accuse Hick of an agnosticism that sets him apart from all major religions. In contrast, Hick is far more in line with major strands of traditional religious thinking on the Ultimate than those among his critics who presuppose that the divine is a reality within the range of conceptual understanding. Hick’s main achievement is to point out a way that retains divine ineffability while at the same time makes cataphatic language meaningful as related to different human experiences of the divine. Finally, I address the question of what kind of interreligious learning is encouraged by Hick’s approach.