University of Münster
CRIS@UM
DE | EN

Contract Design and Uncertainty in Software Development Projects

Gaebert C

Research article (book contribution) | Peer reviewed

Abstract

Recent research has described software development projects in terms of the economic principal agent theory. These models mostly describe the customer as the principal, whereas the supplier is the agent. Our study shows, that regarding gaps in software requirement specifications, the supplier is in a principal situation, and the customer plays the role of an agent. Specifications are incomplete due to systematical reasons. Therefore, the customer must work on closing the gaps during the design and development phase of the project. From this, behavioral uncertainties arise. An empirical study supports our theoretical argument. We discuss consequences from these findings and derive suggestions for practitioners in software development projects.

Details about the publication

Editors: Johansson Björn, Andersson Bo, Holmberg Nicklas
Book title: Perspectives in Business Informatics Research
Page range: 217-230
Publisher: Springer VDI Verlag
Title of series: Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing
Volume of series: 194
Status: Published
Release year: 2014
Language in which the publication is written: English
ISBN: 978-3-319-11369-2
Keywords: Incomplete Information; Principal-Agent Approach; Credible Contract; Software Development Project; Failure Reasons

Authors from the University of Münster

Gaebert, Cornelia
Interorganisational Systems Group (IOS) (IOS)

Projects the publication originates from

Research on Strategic IT/IS Management and Digitalization (RG SIM)
Duration: 01/01/1997 - 31/12/2032
Type of project: Own resources project