Nudging After the Replication Crisis. On Uncertain Effects of Behavioral Governance and the Way Forward

Chatziathanasiou Konstantin

Zusammenfassung

Not so long ago, nudging seemed to many to be the governance tool of the future. Behavioral interventions, like reminders or information about other people’s behavior, come at low cost, help their addressees make better choices, and do not hamper their addresses’ autonomy. Consequently, so called ‘nudge units’ in the US, the UK, Australia, and the EU, among others, guide governments on how to put ‘behavioral insights’ to use. Areas of application are pressing topics such as vaccination decisions or energy consumption. Seven years ago, Verfassungsblog’s milestone symposium and the accompanying volume documented the optimism around nudging at the time, with the critical debate focusing on whether nudging is paternalistic and whether such paternalism can be justified. While such concerns certainly remain legitimate, this blogpost argues that nudging faces an even more fundamental problem (for a longer version of my argument in German, see here). The replication crisis has shaken the behavioral sciences, famous studies have been retracted due to data fraud, and, more generally, the very effectiveness of nudging has been put into question. This calls for a much closer look at how ‘behavioral insights’ are generated in the first place. From a legal perspective, the uncertainty of effects as well as side effects of behavioral interventions are influencing the compatibility of nudges with fundamental rights. Information interventions, it seems, are not as gentle as commonly assumed.