Bidding for Nothing? The Pitfalls of Overly Neutral Framing

Duersch Peter, Müller Julia

Forschungsartikel (Zeitschrift) | Peer reviewed

Zusammenfassung

Neutral framing is a standard tool of experimental economics. However, overly neutral instructions, which lack any contextual clues, can lead to strange behaviour. In a contextless second-price auction for a meaningless good, a majority of subjects enter positive bids - likely a case of cognitive experimenter demand effect. Subjects may interpret the lack of context as being tasked with bidding in the experiment. Adding another auction that has a context drastically reduces the positive bids in the meaningless auction.

Details zur Publikation

FachzeitschriftApplied Economics Letters
Jahrgang / Bandnr. / Volume24
Ausgabe / Heftnr. / Issue17
Seitenbereich932-935
StatusVeröffentlicht
Veröffentlichungsjahr2017
Sprache, in der die Publikation verfasst istEnglisch
DOI10.1080/13504851.2016.1240337

Autor*innen der Universität Münster

Müller, Julia
Professur für Organisationsökonomik (Prof. Dilger)
Institut für Organisationsökonomik (IO)